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This thesis examines the opportunities and risks associated 
with a new form of military cooperation between the United States 
and Russia: joint strategic special operations for counter-
proliferation contingencies--to seize and secure, or to disable 
or otherwise neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
facilities or WMD-armed terrorists. This thesis compares Russian 
and U.S. views of the future security environment, looking for 
areas of overlap that could serve as the basis for mutually 
acceptable cooperative approaches to military options--especially 
in areas in or around the former Soviet Union-- to deal with new 
WMD threats. The most effective military options might require 
the creation of a Russian-American response force similar to the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Emergency Search Team 
(NEST), expanded to be usable against a wide variety of WMD 
threats. This thesis analyzes the circumstances in which 
Russian-American SOF cooperation is more likely to succeed than 
U.S. unilateral action. The analysis concludes that information-
sharing may be the most likely form of cooperation, although any 
Russian-American cooperative effort would reveal to the other 
side sensitive information about capabilities and vulnerabilities 
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This thesis examines the opportunities and risks 
associated with a new form of military cooperation between the 
United States and Russia: joint strategic special operations for 
counterproliferation contingencies--to seize and secure, or to 
disable or otherwise neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
facilities or WMD-armed terrorists. This thesis compares Russian 
and U.S. views of the future security environment, looking for 
areas of overlap that could serve as the basis for mutually 
acceptable cooperative approaches to military options to deal. 
with new WMD threats. The most effective military options--
especially in areas in or around the former Soviet Union--might 
require the creation of a Russian-American response force similar 
to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Emergency Search 
Team (NEST), expanded to be usable against a wide variety of WMD 
threats. This thesis analyzes the circumstances in which 
Russian-American SOF cooperation is more likely to succeed than 
U.S. unilateral action. 
Information-sharing could serve the purpose of Russian-
American cooperation in WMD counterproliferation, and this may 
initially be the most likely area of cooperation. A major 
difficulty is that while the United States and Russia currently 
enjoy good relations, a change in the Russian political 
xi 
leadership could rapidly reverse this, and previously provided 
information could be used to the detriment of U.S. security 
interests. The proposed solution to this difficulty is to make 
agreements to share needed information only when the 
circumstances of the situation make it expedient to do so. 
The United States still might have a "window of opportunity" 
to engage the Russians in bilateral counterproliferation 
activities, one component of which could be contingency SOF 
counterforce exercises. Because it is the primary inheritor of 
the former Soviet Union's WMD arsenal, Russia's involvement is 
essential to prevent a loss of control over these WMD materials 
and associated expertise. The disorganization following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and current economic difficulties in 
the former Soviet states make this region the most likely source 
of leakage of weapons of mass destruction, fissile materials and 
WMD expertise. The cooperation envisioned by this thesis need 
not require substantial new resources; equipment and training 
already provided or in place could be sufficient if innovative 
operational planning was undertaken. The effectiveness of any 
policy to prevent or counter WMD proliferation could be enhanced 
by including Russia in its development and execution. 
xii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the desirability of cooperation between 
the United States and Russia to conduct joint strategic special 
operations. 1 Cooperation using special operations forces (SOF) 
might be particularly useful in counterproliferation 
contingencies--to seize and secure, disable, or otherwise 
neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities or WMD-
armed terrorists. U.S. leadership in this effort is a 
responsibility derived from America's role as a global 
superpower. Although Russia is distracted by its economic and 
internal political struggles, WMD proliferation is a long-term 
threat to Russian security as well. Moreover, as David Yost has 
noted, "nuclear forces offer one of the few ways Russia has left 
to claim superpower status and prestige."2 The Russians 
therefore have multiple incentives to prevent a proliferation of 
nuclear weapons to other powers, and by extension all forms of 
WMD. 
1Defined as "secret military or paramilitary strikes ... that 
seek to resolve through the sudden, swift, and unconventional 
application of force major problems of U.S. foreign policy" in 
Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as 
an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), p. 4. 
2David S. Yost, "Europe and Nuclear Deterrence," Survival, 
vol. 35, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), p. 103. 
1 
Preventive diplomacy remains the first line of defense in 
the campaign against the spread of WMD. The goal of 
nonproliferation diplomacy in this regard is to ensure 
multinational cooperation in export controls, border controls, 
and police actions, as most WMD material and related technology 
from Russia is exported through official channels. 3 When the 
threat presented overwhelms the capabilities of these civilian 
agencies, military force might provide the only means to deal 
with the problem. 4 
This thesis compares Russian and U.S. views of the future 
security environment, particularly with regard to WMD 
proliferation contingencies which might exceed the capabilities 
of civilian agencies. The comparison looks for areas of overlap 
that could serve as the basis for mutually acceptable cooperative 
approaches to military responses to these threats. The thesis 
then examines the possible ways that information-sharing could 
serve the purpose of Russian-American cooperation in WMD 
counterproliferation, as this may initially be the most likely 
area of cooperation. 
The most effective military options might require the 
3William C. Potter, "Before the Deluge? Assessing the 
Threat of Nuclear Leakage From the Post-Soviet States,ff Arms 
Control Today, vol. 25, no. 8 (October 1995), p. 14. 
4Barbara Starr, "Law Enforcement Role Sought for U.S. 
Military,ff Jane's Defence Weekly, 29 April 95, p. 5. 
2 
creation of a Russian-American response force similar to the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), 
expanded to be usable against nuclear, biological and chemical 
threats (referred to in this thesis as NBC-EST) . The NEST 
methodology is to bring to the area of a suspected nuclear device 
specially-trained experts in nuclear weapons design, together 
with the FBI and public safety officials, to search for and (if 
necessary) disarm the device. This thesis suggests how this 
methodology could be made effective against nuclear, chemical and 
biological threats through "electronic reach-back" techniques 
currently being explored by the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) 
Commandant's Warfighting Lab (CWL). 
A. U.S. COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY 
Today the idea of conducting preemptive military strikes, 
usually with the image of the June 1981 Israeli raid against 
Iraq's Osirak reactor in mind, produces international anxiety. 
When counterproliferation was announced as the first major 
defense initiative of the Clinton administration, many feared 
that the United States, as the world's sole superpower, was now 
devising the means to unilaterally and preemptively destroy the 
nuclear programs of countries in the developing world. Faced 
with this outcry, the Clinton administration backtracked. 
According to Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss, "although some 
Pentagon officials privately admit that counterproliferation 
3 
still envisions preemptive military strikes, more senior 
officials, especially Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton 
Carter, have explicitly and repeatedly disavowed any such role." 5 
Western nations have raised several objections to the idea 
of the U.S. or NATO planning preemptive military strikes. The 
most important is that such military action should be sanctioned 
by the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council on 31 January 
1992, with the support of the United States, declared that the 
proliferation of WMD constituted a threat to international peace 
and security. This opened the possibility of utilizing all the 
sanctions available under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 
including military measures, in response to WMD proliferation 
threats. 6 Other objections included the possible collateral 
consequences of preemptive strikes, such as radioactive fallout, 
and the fear that military options might be seen as more 
attractive than diplomatic and economic ones. 
Current Clinton administration counterproliferation policy 
emphasizes that military forces are more likely to be called on 
to protect a country threatened by WMD than to strike a state's 
WMD facilities. In this regard there has been considerable 
investment in protective technologies, particularly for ballistic 
5Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss, "Counterproliferation: 
Putting New Wine in Old Bottles," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 
18, no. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 143. 
6Ibid., p. 146-147. 
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missile defense. Special operations forces continue to quietly 
train for counterforce operations which range from being able to 
find and destroy mobile missiles to neutralizing underground 
facilities. Such actions might be termed "neutralization" of WMD 
capabilities after the war has started, but the same weapons and 
tactics could easily be used for preventive or preemptive 
purposes before the onset of hostilities. 
B. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA 
The United States has long-term political motives for trying 
to obtain Russian cooperation in a coalition for WMD 
counterproliferation contingencies. According to the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) , "the Defense Counterproliferation 
Initiative places great emphasis on international cooperation in 
preparation for future crises or conflicts where the threat or 
use of [WMD] may be present."7 The benefits of international 
cooperation may include a pooling of resources and sharing 
political responsibility. While the DOD report primarily refers 
to cooperation with traditional U.S. allies in NATO, the April 
1996 Group of Seven (G-7) plus Russia summit on nuclear security 
and safety issues in Moscow suggests that there is high-level 
70ffice of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat 
and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
April 1996), p. 56. 
5 
consensus that Russian cooperation is also important. 8 
This thesis recognizes that Americans hold various views on 
counterproliferation policy, and that there is no agreement on 
the advisability of conducting joint strategic special 
operations. This thesis does not attempt to assess the 
likelihood of success of any specific preemptive strategic 
special operation. This thesis presumes that, fully cognizant of 
the risks involved and with due caution, U.S. policymakers may 
choose to embark on a strategic special operation and may have 
the opportunity to consider whether it would be more likely to 
succeed with some form of Russian cooperation. The key 
assumption is that both Russia and the United States would have 
exhausted (or dismissed as inadequate) all other non-military 
(diplomatic, political and economic) options and must resort to a 
preemptive operation to prevent the employment of a WMD. 
C. COALITION IMPLEMENTATION 
Russian-American cooperation for emergency response would 
not necessarily require an integrated standing force. Instead, 
coalitions could be formed in response to specific threats, with 
the extent of the cooperation determined by the circumstances. 
This would be more than an ad hoc coalition as the possibility of 
cooperation would have been anticipated, and preparations 
8
"Nuclear Security After the Moscow Summit," Strategic 
Comments, June 1996, pp. 1-3. 
6 
(including common training and equipment) would have been made. 
However, information-sharing regarding sensitive subjects such as 
the "safing" of nuclear weapons (including permissive action link 
mechanisms that prevent nuclear devices from detonating) or the 
properties of other WMD would not occur until so decided by the 
political leadership as necessary, given the threat. 
Russian-American cooperative efforts could reveal to the 
other side information considered sensitive about the 
capabilities and vulnerabilities in that area of cooperation. 
What if this sensitive information fell into the hands of 
another Stalin, or (from the Russian point of view) another 
Truman? It must be acknowledged that a return to authoritarian 
rule in Russia is possible. 9 Some analysts would argue that if 
this is possible, the only sensible approach for the United 
States would be to refrain from cooperation with the Russians, 
especially with regard to sensitive military matters, or to 
restrict such cooperation to the greatest degree possible. 
A method for handling this difficulty is suggested by 
examining current Russian-American cooperation in military 
matters. Tentative bilateral cooperative efforts have begun in 
9John Keegan, "Who Says a Hitler Could Never Happen Again?" 
Dailv Telegraph, 23 March 1995, p. 18, Nexis, online. The Nexis 
database does not show the paging within a document; when a page 
number is given, it refers to the first page on which the 
document appears in the newspaper or journal. 
7 
many counterproliferation-related areas: in the "loose nuke" 
scenario (a lost or stolen nuclear weapon that might be used in a 
terrorist incident) , 10 in an international law-enforcement 
training program aimed at nuclear smuggling and terrorism, 11 and 
in a theater missile defense (TMD) exercise. 12 The pattern of 
proposed cooperation in all cases is similar: the United States 
assembles a coalition in which Russia is given a limited 
responsibility in an auxiliary capacity. This thesis analyzes 
this pattern to assess whether potential Russian-American SOF 
cooperation in the area of WMD counterproliferation is more 
likely to succeed than U.S. unilateral action in the same 
circumstances. 
D. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
Chapter II examines Russia's potential interest in Russian-
American cooperation in dealing with WMD contingencies. There is 
a range of views in Russia on cooperating with the United States 
and on the appropriate response to the proliferation of WMD, but 
10 John H. Nuckolls, "Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers: 
Proliferation and Terrorism," Science, vol. 267 (24 February 
1995), p. 1113. 
11
"Prepared Statement of Ambassador Richard L. Morningstar, 
Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for 
Assistance to the Newly Independent States, before the House 
Committee on International Relations," Federal News Service, 13 
June 1996, unpaged, Nexis, online. 
12Robert Holzer, "U.S. Plans Joint Missile-Defense Exercise 
With Russia," Defense News, 8-14 May 1995, p. 12. 
8 
it is possible to conclude that Russia might well be willing to 
consider a bilateral operation if this was consistent with 
Russian security interests. 
Chapter III analyzes the desirability of Russian-American 
cooperation in two types of hypothetical WMD contingencies: 
operations against rogue states and against WMD-armed terrorists. 
Three types of SOF missions to neutralize WMD facilities or WMD-
are terrorists are considered: detection, interdiction, and 
sabotage. Military criteria and short- and long-term political 
criteria are examined to determine the likely effectiveness of 
bilateral cooperation. 
Chapter IV considers the feasibility of Russian-American SOF 
cooperation by looking at three precedents and three models. The 
precedents include joint peacekeeping, the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program, and cooperation in the chemical and biological 
weapons areas. The Russian Spetsnaz model is described to show 
how Russia might approach dealing with WMD contingencies, 
although there is doubt as to the current operational 
effectiveness of the Spetsnaz forces. Two U.S. models are 
examined: the Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Special Mission 
Units. The USMC Commandant's Warfighting Lab is discussed as an 
example of the type of innovative thinking necessary to resolve 
the command and control difficulties that a bilateral SOF team 
might face. 
9 
Chapter V discusses how to implement cooperation in WMD 
contingencies. An evolutionary approach similar to the Russian-
American experiences with confidence and security-building 
exercises seems to be most likely to build mutual trust. 
Chapter VI concludes that the United States and Russia may 
encounter extraordinary circumstances that would justify 
preparations to engage in joint strategic special operations. 
10 
II. RUSSIAN VIEWS OF WMD PROLIFERATION CHALLENGE 
This chapter highlights Russian views of the future security 
environment that might serve as the basis for developing 
cooperative approaches with the United States with regard to WMD 
proliferation contingencies. The most authoritative expression 
of the Russian government's position is the 1993 Foreign 
Intelligence Service (FIS) Report on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. 13 Russian views concerning the future security 
environment, including pro-Western and anti-Western perspectives, 
are reviewed as well. The impact of the conflict in Chechnya may 
be to promote a shift away from pro-Western views. 
A. RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPORT ON WMD 
While head of the FIS, Yevgeniy Primakov in January 1993 
issued a report on the threat that WMD proliferation poses for 
Russia. The main danger to Russia of the proliferation of WMD is 
that it "superimposes itself on the development of conflict 
situations at the regional level. " 14 In other words, WMD can 
intensify and complicate conflicts occurring in areas bordering 
13Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New 
Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, translated by the CIA as JPRS-TND-93-007, dated 5 
March 1993. 
14 Sergei Nikishov and Sergei Staroselsky, "WMD Proliferation 
Poses a Major Problem--Primakov," ITAR-TASS, 28 January 1993, 
unpaged, Nexis, online. 
11 
Russia. "Russia is not interested in the emergence of new states 
possessing weapons of mass destruction along the perimeter of its 
borders. " 15 
Vigilance is the most important measure to prevent the 
emergence of such states. The FIS Report discusses many 
indications that a state is either developing or has acquired WMD 
in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or other treaties 
and agreements. This is an assessment activity already being 
conducted by various national intelligence services; the report 
suggests that an international system would be preferable. "An 
effective practical means of counteracting the proliferation of 
WMD could be the creation and use of a global 'early-warning' 
system based on scientifically substantiated criteria."16 
According to the FIS, should a violation be detected, the 
appropriate action would be the imposition of political and 
economic sanctions on the offending state based on a decision by 
the United Nations. 
Sanctions are an option when sufficient early warning has 
been obtained. In the event of an unexpected act of terrorism 
involving the use of WMD, the sponsoring state can expect 
commensurate retaliation. "Such a terrorist act can be followed 
15Daniel Sneider, "Former KGB Details Nuclear Arms Spread," 
Christian Science Monitor, 1 February 1993, p. 8, Nexis, online. 
16Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, p. 20. 
12 
by 'adequate' retaliatory actions by the 'victimized party' that 
are now aimed at the state whose citizens allegedly participated 
in the terrorist act." 17 The FIS report only considers state-
sponsored terrorism; it remains unclear how Russia might deal 
with a non-state terrorist group such as Aum Shinrikyo. The FIS 
report suggests, however, that Primakov can be expected to 
support the strengthening of existing nonproliferation regimes 
and that, in dealing with terrorism, Primakov may support 
military options. 
B. PRO-WESTERN 
The 'pro-Western' school is most closely aligned with 
Western interests and seeks to discourage WMD proliferation; this 
school represented Russia at the April-May 1995 Non-Proliferation 
Treaty extension conference, among other settings. The most 
prominent spokesman for this school was Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, who was ousted from that position 
in December 1995 in response to increased anti-Western sentiments 
in Russian society. 18 
1. Kozyrev 
Andrei Kozyrev was the last Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
17 Ibid., p. 3. 
18Alessandra Stanley, "Yeltsin Ushers Out His Foreign 
Minister," New York Times, 7 January 1996, section 4, p. 2, 
Nexis, online. 
13 
the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and the first Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and he was responsible 
for the creation of its initial pro-Western foreign policy. As 
this foreign policy matured, Russian security interests began to 
clash with those in the West. The partnership between Russia and 
the United States began to resemble "the relations of a married 
couple whose honeymoon is over and who now have to face their 
day-to-day life, with all its ups and downs." 19 This moderate 
sensibility was criticized by increasingly vocal nationalists, 
and Kozyrev was dismissed by President Yeltsin to improve 
Yeltsin's popularity in anticipation of the 1996 presidential 
elections. 
2 . Karaganov 
Supporters of a greater strategic partnership between the 
United States and Russia gathered in a joint project, which was 
co-chaired by Fred C. Ikle of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington, D.C., and Sergei A. 
Karaganov of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow. 
This project encouraged the most positive appreciation of an 
effective Russian-American security and defense partnership. "It 
is highly unlikely that the foreign policy of either Moscow or 
Washington would, in the future, favor a global U.S.-Russian 
19Andrei Kozyrev, "Partnership or Cold Peace," Foreign 
Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 8-9. 
14 
condominium. On the contrary, the U.S.-Russian security link 
could become the backbone of a security community encompassing 
the Northern Hemisphere."20 This sentiment was published in 1993 
and may represent a high point in the post-Cold War euphoria. 
C. MIXED 
At present, nationalist sentiments can be found at every 
level of Russian society. "Politicians of all stripes talk about 
the 'specialness' of Russia, of its intrinsic incompatibility 
with Western models of democracy." 21 The present foreign policy 
can be called mixed, for as former Ambassador to Russia Jack 
Matlock has noted,"Russian foreign policy remains generally 
consistent with U.S. interests despite occasional outbursts of 
hostile rhetoric."22 Kozyrev was replaced as Foreign Minister by 
Yevgeniy Primakov, who was previously head of the Russian 
Federation Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS), the successor to 
the KGB. Primakov has long argued that Russia must take a more 
confrontational approach to the outside world, and his views 
exemplify the mixed school. 
2
°Fred C. Ikle and Sergei A. Kraganov, Harmonizing the 
Evolution of U.S. and Russian Defense Policies (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 11. 
21Alessandra Stanley, "Stripped of Themes, Yeltsin Wraps 
Himself in Flag," New York Times, 19 April 1996, p. A3, Nexis, 
online. 
22 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "Dealing with a Russia in Turmoil," 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 3 (May/June 1996), p. 39. 
15 
In an interview published in the Russian newspaper Trud, 
Primakov outlined three negative trends that Russian foreign 
policy should counter: the view that Russia lost the Cold War (it 
should be seen as a universal victory), the creation of a 
unipolar (U.S.-dominated) world, and Russia being diminished to 
the status of a source of raw materials. 23 All of these issues 
deal with the question of status. 
The importance of· status for Russians can be better 
understood from a historical and cultural perspective. The 
typical Russian accepts the new Russian state because he believes 
that Russians made the sacrifices which created Imperial Russia 
and the accomplishments of the Soviet Union; the peripheral 
republics reaped the rewards and were ungrateful at that. Russia 
should be better off without them, according to this thinking. 24 
The new Russia emphasizes the greatness of its past, to show 
Russians that while further sacrifices may be necessary, even 
greater rewards can be expected in the future. This also serves 
to show non-Russians the benefits they receive by association. 
The difficulty here is that one of the measures of Russia's 
greatness is the size of its erstwhile empire. Russians often 
23
"Foreign Minister Primakov Sets Out Foreign Policy 
Priorities,H BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 June 1996, 
unpaged, Nexis, online. 
24 The most prominent advocate of this position is Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn. See his book Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and 
Tentative Proposals (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1991). 
16 
claim special rights in the "near abroad," particularly those 
areas in which a sizable Russian-speaking minority resides. One 
foreign policy issue on which there is widespread agreement in 
Russia is that the expansion of NATO represents a direct threat 
to Russia and impinges upon Russia's ability to sway events 
within its self-defined "natural" sphere of influence. The mixed 
school may demand that its security concerns vis-a-vis NATO be 
satisfied before it would accept deepened cooperation with the 
United States. 
D. ANTI-WESTERN 
The anti-Western forces in Russia are generally extreme 
nationalists who see threats from the West in many forms, 
including decadent moral values, the expansion of NATO, and the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal. These extreme nationalists are for the 
most part unelected relics of the Soviet era who still run 
Russia's state machinery. "These nomenklatura nationalists are 
supported by people in the unreformed parts of the economy--
agriculture, coal, and defense--who know they cannot survive 
unless they go on getting huge state hand-outs."25 The position 
of these managers is threatened by the economic and political 
reforms which have followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
The Western advisors who advocate these reforms are scapegoats 
25
"The Rise of the New Right," The Economist, 28 January 
1995, p. 23. 
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during this period of turmoil, and the extreme nationalists 
attempt to discredit reform by attacking the West. 
The clearest 'anti-Western' voice is that of Anton 
Surikov, 26 who wrote a paper contending that the United States 
and its allies should be considered Russia's key potential 
enemies: 
At present, NATO outnumbers Russia two- to three-fold 
in personnel and conventional arms in Europe. After 
Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia (sic) 
join this military alliance, the gap will increase. In 
such a situation the only possible solution lies in 
restraining NATO with nuclear weapons. 27 
The "anti-Western" school would deliberately disseminate WMD 
knowledge and materials in response to certain "provocations," 
such as the expansion of NATO. This "threatened proliferation as 
a deterrent" could involve reintroducing Russian nuclear weapons 
into Belarus (which would amount to a redeployment of Russian 
capabilities rather than an increase in nuclear weapons decision 
centers), or courting alliances with rogue states by providing 
them with WMD materials or expertise. 
Within the anti-Western school of thought are the 
26Surikov is a research fellow at the "independent and 
highly influential" Institute of Defense Studies in Moscow, 
according to David Hearst in "Focus/Russia's Rusting Army: 
Limping Giant Beats a Slow Retreat," The Guardian, 3 February 
1996, p. 13, Nexis, online. 
27Anton Surikov, "Special Institute Staff Suggests Russia 
Oppose NATO and the U.S.A.," Segodnya, 20 October 1995, 
translated by the Conflict Studies Research Centre at Royal 
Military Academy Sandhurst, England. 
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nationalist views of the mixed school. The differences are 
mainly that the anti-Westerners distort these nationalist views 
into outlooks with little room for compromise. To the degree 
that the extreme nationalists continue to occupy management 
positions, they may be able to obstruct cooperative activities 
with the West within their realm. The mixed school is presently 
dominant in Russian society, which offers the possibility of 
increased cooperation in WMD counterproliferation if such 
cooperation is consistent with Russian national security 
interests. 
E. IMPACT OF CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA 
Russia's attention for the moment is focused on its own 
stability. Chechnya was the first and has been, to date, the 
most strident territory within the Russian Federation to declare 
its independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The 
Russian government was distracted by its consolidation efforts, 
so the region was largely ignored until the implications of 
Chechnya's drive for independence were declared unacceptable by 
Moscow. According to Benjamin Lambeth, "Russia's troubling 
intervention in Chechnya ... for all its overkill in concept and 
ineptitude in execution, was not a manifestation of imperial 
inclinations but rather a costly and bumbling effort to head off 
a dangerous precedent that could eventually trigger a 
19 
disintegration of the Russian Federation." 28 Lacking vital 
interests in the area, the United States has muted its criticism 
of this Russian action. 
The poor performance of Russian military forces in Chechnya 
has raised questions about the operational effectiveness of these 
forces. 29 To some military leaders, only Russia's nuclear 
weapons remain to make sure the West takes Russian security 
concerns seriously. Calling attention to Russian nuclear forces 
is Russia's way of insisting that its security concerns on 
subjects like NATO expansion be taken seriously. As Leszek 
Buszynski has observed, ~the West will have to be patient and 
firm with Russia and make clear that there are limits to how far 
it can go to meet Moscow's concerns." 30 
F. SUMMARY 
The present political environment in Russia is more 
nationalistic than it was during the immediate post-Cold War 
euphoria. Such nationalism has caused the Russians to limit 
their cooperation with the West across the board. Some 
28Benj amin S. Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military," Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 95. 
29Anatol Lieven, ~Russia's Military Nadir: The Meaning of 
the Chechen Debacle," The National Interest, no. 44 (Summer 
1996)' p. 26. 
30Leszek Buszynski, ~Russia and the West: Towards Renewed 
Geopolitical Rivalry?" Survival, vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 
123. 
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Americans, having observed this retrenchment, have also cooled 
their enthusiasm for working with the Russians. Consequently, 
progress for new initiatives has become glacial. Still, there 
was a tradition of strong U.S.-Soviet cooperation on nuclear 
nonproliferation even when the Cold War was at its coldest. This 
included the establishment of the IAEA and the negotiation of the 
NPT. This tradition has continued in the post-Soviet period, 
notably at the 1995 NPT extension conference, a circumstance that 
offers hope for the expansion and deepening of WMD 
counterproliferation cooperative efforts. 
While both Russian and U.S. theorists have considered the 
problem of WMD proliferation, each side assesses the problem 
differently. The asymmetry stems from the fact that the United 
States is a global superpower, while Russia is not. The new 
Russian military doctrine clearly states that Russia regards no 
country as an adversary. "The difference in the countries' 
assessments of the ramifications of proliferation of WMD and 
missile delivery means is thus better understood: the United 
States perceives it as a threat, while Russia perceives it merely 
as a problem, since Russia is not directly threatened by the 
missiles of third countries." 31 Russia is still in the process 
31 Sergei Kortunov, "Russian-American Cooperation on 
Counterproliferation," The Monitor (Center for International 
Trade and Security at the University of Georgia), Fall 1995, p. 
8. Mr Kortunov is on the staff of Yuri Baturin, the national 
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of defining its national security interests, and as enemies and 
allies are identified Russia may rely more explicitly on military 
power to deter its enemies and protect its allies. 
Russians are aware of the dangers of WMD terrorism, which 
were highlighted by a recent incident in Moscow. Chechen 
separatists led by one of Chechnya's best-known rebel leaders, 
Shamil Basayev, buried a box containing radioactive cesium near 
the entrance to a popular Moscow park as a threat of possible 
WMD-type future terrorist acts to support the Chechen fight for 
independence. 32 More serious perhaps are the WMD development 
programs of China, Iraq, Pakistan, India and Iran, countries 
which lie just beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. 33 
Such circumstances may help persuade the Russians to support 
international cooperation in dealing with WMD 
counterproliferation contingencies. 
security adviser to the Russian President. 
32Michael Specter, "Chechen Insurgents Take Their Struggle 
to a Moscow Park," New York Times, 24 November 1995, p. A1. 
33 Sherman Garnett, "Russia Ponders Its Nuclear Options," 
Washington Times, 6 November 1995, p. A25. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS OF SOF COOPERATION 
Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of any WMD 
employment, this thesis assumes the need for a early and decisive 
response. The key assumption is that both Russia and the United 
States would have exhausted (or dismissed as inadequate) all 
other non-military (diplomatic, political and economic) options 
before engaging in a preemptive action, recognizing that such 
preemptive action would be by definition an act of war. Barry R. 
Schneider has suggested eleven cautionary questions that should 
be addressed when deciding whether the United States should 
intervene with military force in any given proliferation 
situation, such as whether U.S. vital interests are directly 
threatened and whether surprise is achievable. 34 This thesis 
assumes the answer to all these questions is "yes", and the issue 
under consideration is whether the operation would have a greater 
likelihood of success with Russian cooperation. 
In order to visualize the types of situations in which a 
Russian-American SOF force might be called into action, two 
categories of possible adversaries might be considered: rogue 
states and WMD-armed terrorists. For these hypothetical WMD 
34 Barry R. Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: 
Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University, May 1995), pp. 23-26. 
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contingencies, three types of possible SOF missions are analyzed: 
detection, interdiction, and sabotage. Criteria are then 
presented to determine whether these possible SOF missions would 
be more likely to succeed with Russian cooperation. 
A. HYPOTHETICAL WMD CONTINGENCIES 
At present, leading candidates for classification as rogue 
states are Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. 35 This thesis 
examines the case of Iran for illustrative purposes only, not to 
imply that it is a likely prospect for joint Russian-American 
operations. Iran supports insurgents against the Russian-backed 
regime in Tajikistan as well as threatening U.S. interests in the 
Persian Gulf. These circumstances might help to make Iran the 
scene of some sort of cooperative counterproliferation operation. 
Among non-state actors, this thesis proposes for analysis a 
hypothetical WMD-armed terrorist who directly targets U.S. 
interests and whose source of WMD is the former Soviet arsenal, 
ostensibly under Russian control. To maintain control over its 
WMD arsenal, Russia could be expected to cooperate in recovering 
Russian assets acquired by terrorists. 
1. Rogue States 
Iran's growing military capabilities have been the focus of 
U.S. concern. "A fresh U.S. warning about Iran's military 
35Barry R. Schneider, pp. 6-7. 
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program came ... from the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central 
Command, who said that the pace of Tehran's recent modernization 
efforts in naval capabilities, missile acquisition and weapons of 
mass destruction far exceeded its defense needs." 36 In June 
1995, the United States imposed a trade and investment ban on 
Iran, in view of Iran's efforts to foster terrorism and develop 
nuclear weapons. 
During the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein repeatedly tried to 
destroy the Iranian nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Seven air 
strikes eventually destroyed most of the known Iranian capability 
to produce special nuclear materials. 37 Despite strong 
objections from the United States, the Russian Ministry of Atomic 
Energy has signed a contract to rebuild the damaged structures 
and install a Russian reactor. 38 
A reconstructed Bushehr reactor might not present a key and 
fragile target. After Israel's 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osirak 
reactor, Hussein chose several less vulnerable alternative paths 
to developing WMD. Iran can be expected to have profited from 
Iraq's experience in the Gulf War, and has probably attempted to 
36
"Israeli, U.S. or Joint Strike Against Iran Seems Just a 
Matter of Time," Mideast Mirror (U.K.), 24 May 1996, p. 2, Nexis, 
online. 
37Barry R. Schneider, p. 15. 
38
"Russians to Begin Nuclear Complex in Iran," New York 
Times, 21 August 1995, p. A2, Nexis, online. 
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conceal efforts to develop WMD. 39 Iran would have other secret 
and well-fortified installations if indeed it is attempting to 
develop nuclear weapons and other WMD. 
Because the United States lacks diplomatic relations with 
Iran and has banned business-related contacts, U.S. opportunities 
to collect information on Iranian intentions and on installations 
not observable by national technical means are limited. Russia 
has both diplomatic relations and pertinent business contacts 
with Iran, and could be a valuable source of information about 
Iranian intentions and secret installations. One plausible 
linkage for providing this information to the United States might 
be related to the conflict in Tajikistan. 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, militant Islamic 
fundamentalists supported by Iran attacked the pro-Moscow 
government of President Rakhmon Nabiyev. Russia intervened under 
the pretext of protecting non-Tajiks in the republic, with the 
assistance of token forces from other Central Asian states that 
feared that instability in Tajikistan could spread. According 
to Mark Galeotti, "with around 20,000 Russian troops in-country 
though, Moscow is clearly in control, and here 'peacekeeping' 
really means supporting a friendly government - indeed, some have 
39 For an elaboration, see David A. Kay, "Denial and 
Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyondff in 
Brad Roberts, ed., Weapons Proliferation in the 1990s (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 305-325. 
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characterized it as little more than a puppet regime - against 
rebels whose activities could undermine regional stability and 
the underpinnings of Russian security on its southern borders." 40 
Russian intervention here is on such a scale that the 
independence of Tajikistan is nominal and Russian troops are 
likely to be needed indefinitely. Russian troops are in 
Tajikistan for several reasons, including to intercept assistance 
to insurgents via Afghanistan from Iran. The Russian sale of 
nuclear technology to Iran might be looked at not only as a 
financial transaction but also as important for neutralizing the 
threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia by lessening 
Iranian support to insurgents. An increase of Iranian pressure 
in Tajikistan might prompt Russia to be less friendly with Iran 
and more amenable to supplying intelligence or otherwise 
cooperating with the United States. 
2. WMD-Armed Terrorists 
This thesis uses the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo as its 
model of a hypothetical WMD-armed terrorist that directly targets 
U.S. interests and whose source of WMD is the former Soviet 
arsenal under Russian control. The cult made extensive efforts 
to buy materials for nuclear and chemical weapons from Russia. 
40Mark Galeotti, "Russia and Eurasia: Out-of-Area Operations 
and Peacekeeping," Jane's Intelligence Review, 31 December 1994, 
p. 35. 
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Given the sad state of Russian inventory control, this could 
easily be done surreptitiously. According to Michael Gordon, 
"Russia has no way of knowing for sure if any of its vast supply 
of bomb ingredients is missing, many of its own nuclear officials 
and scientists admit. " 41 According to Senator Sam Nunn (D-
Georgia), the ability of the cult to acquire and manufacture WMD 
makes it "a prime example of what I believe to be our greatest 
national security contern in the years ahead." 42 
One difference between a rogue state and a WMD-armed 
terrorist is the relative ease with which they can acquire WMD. 
Iran could be presumed to be developing a variety of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons with the resources of the country 
at its disposal, while a terrorist might be limited to a small 
quantity of one type of WMD. It is useful to consider the 
implications if the choice is nuclear, chemical, or biological. 
a. Nuclear Terrorism 
Nuclear terrorism could take many forms. According to 
Karl-Heinz Kamp, "they range from the actual detonation of 
nuclear weapons or acts of nuclear violence, for example, in the 
form of the release of radioactive substances or the radioactive 
41Michael R. Gordon, "Russian Controls on Bomb Material are 
Leaky," New York Times, 18 August 1994, p. A1, Nexis, online. 
42Cited in Christopher Drew, "Japanese Sect Tried to Buy 
U.S. Arms Technology, Senator Says," New York Times, 31 October 
1995, p. AS, Nexis, online. 
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contamination of drinking water, to acts of sabotage in and 
against nuclear power plants." 43 Detonation has been regarded as 
the least likely form of nuclear terrorism, due to the hurdle of 
manufacturing a nuclear device; obtaining an intact device from 
the former Soviet arsenal could increase the likelihood of such 
terrorism. This hypothetical nuclear scenario assumes that a 
Russian nuclear weapon is on board a ship in the harbor of a U.S. 
city. 44 A traditional NEST might be employed against this 
threat, possibly assisted by Russia with intelligence on the 
terrorist or details on the device. 
b. Chemical Terrorism 
Of the three categories of WMD, chemical weapons may be 
the most likely to be used. The dual-use (military and 
commercial) potential of many chemicals makes them readily 
available to terrorists. According to the Office of Technology 
Assessment, "although well-equipped troops can defend themselves 
against existing chemical agents with detectors, decontamination 
equipment, gas masks, and protective garments (albeit at some 
cost in military effectiveness), chemical weapons can still have 
43Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism--Facts and Fiction," 
unpublished manuscript, p. 3. 
44 Taken from Uwe Nerlich, The Political and Strategic 
Analysis of Nuclear Non-state Actors and Sponsoring States: What 




devastating effects when employed against defenseless 
civilians." 4s This hypothetical chemical scenario begins with an 
unemployed Russian chemist advising a terrorist group on the 
manufacture of a poison gas to be released during the summer 1996 
Olympics in Atlanta. 46 An NBC-EST might be employed against this 
threat, possibly assisted by Russia in the form of intelligence 
on the terrorist or on the expertise of the chemist. 
c. Biological Terrorism 
Biological weapons pose potentially greater dangers 
than either chemical or nuclear weapons because they are so 
lethal on a pound-for-pound basis, their production requires a 
much smaller and cheaper industrial infrastructure, and the 
necessary technology and know-how are almost entirely dual-use. 47 
Technical factors relating to the difficulty of handling 
substances of such lethality may have prevented terrorists from 
employing biological weapons to date, but prudence dictates 
preparedness for the possibility in the future. In this 
hypothetical scenario, an unemployed Russian biologist advises a 
45U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993), p. 15. 
46Based on Marc Rice, "Atlanta to Simulate Tokyo Subway 
Attack for Olympic Drill," Associated Press Online, 11 January 
1996, unpaged, Nexis, online. 
47U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, p. 73. 
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terrorist on the fermentation of anthrax spores which could be 
dispersed over New York City. 48 An NBC-EST might be employed 
against this threat, possibly assisted by Russia in the form of 
intelligence on the terrorist or on the specialization of the 
biologist. 
B. TYPES OF SOF MISSIONS 
Three types of SOF missions could be employed in a WMD 
scenario. Detection is the search for WMD, both for its location 
and for its characteristics. Interdiction is the seizure and 
disablement or destruction of WMD. Sabotage refers to those 
actions which would prevent an adversary from manufacturing a 
WMD. Each of these missions might be attempted in the above 
hypothetical WMD contingencies. 
1. Detection 
Detection goes beyond the sharing of intelligence about the 
adversary. Cooperation on the level of information-sharing has 
to be presumed before a cooperative action can be considered. 
According to Jeffrey Simon, "governments are more willing to 
cooperate in information-sharing than in other counterterrorist 
measures, since counterterrorist intelligence can be done 
'quietly,' without fanfare and without the risks involved in 
48Based on Robert H. Kupperman and David M. Smith, "Coping 
with Biological Terrorism," in Brad Roberts, ed., Biological 
Weapons: Weapons of the Future? (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1994), pp. 41-43. 
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other types of joint antiterrorist ventures." 49 For action 
against the terrorist armed with WMD materials obtained from 
Russian sources, however, Russia would have to transfer highly 
sensitive information concerning its own WMD arsenals and the 
security systems which surround them. Even though the United 
States and Russia currently enjoy good relations, a change in the 
Russian political leadership could rapidly reverse this. The 
Russians might fear that previously provided information could be 
used to the detriment of Russian security interests. 
Vital yet sensitive information might be subject to 
misinterpretation in the detection phase of the counterterrorist 
operation, because the information release process might hamper 
the flow of communications. For this reason, the sides might 
benefit from an exchange of liaison officers to provide an 
immediate capability to clarify what information is needed or the 
meaning of the information provided. If properly trained, 
liaison officers could help overcome some of the cultural 
barriers which create misunderstandings. For example, building a 
close relationship with the Russians could allow for 
communication exchanges that would not otherwise take place. 
Americans tend, however, frequently to rotate in and out of 
49 Jeffrey D. Simon, U.S. Countermeasures Against 
International Terrorism (RAND Publication R-3840-C3I, 1990), p. 
v. 
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positions, a practice which hampers continuity in working 
relationships. While cultural differences may seem to be 
obstacles to effective cooperation, at the working level both 
nations' military forces can have pride in their units and 
capabilities. Given a common task, soldiers in the field could 
be expected to devise whatever shortcuts or expedients might be 
necessary to improve cooperation so that the mission is 
accomplished. 
One shortcut that would increase Russian-American 
cooperation but that would not require the integration of forces 
would be to divide the search area into separate zones. A simple 
model of this expedient can be seen in the planning for a 
Russian-U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) command post exercise 
(CPX) held 3-7 June 1996 at the Joint National Test Facility 
(JNTF) at Falcon AFB, Colorado. 50 In the exercise scenario, a 
fictional third country asked for protection from an adversary's 
short-range ballistic missiles. Russia and the United States 
agreed to defend this country not by integrating their 
capabilities, but rather by dividing the country into zones which 
each would defend with its own forces and equipment. It is 
simpler not to integrate the forces, but this arrangement 
5
°Charles Aldinger, "U.S., Russian Troops Set Missile 
Exercise," Reuters World Service, 25 April 1996, unpaged, Nexis, 
online. 
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increases the demands on the coalition leadership to trust the 
other side. 
The implications of the exercise scenario are that the 
Russian "zone" in WMD counterproliferation might be the territory 
of the Russian Federation and possibly the "near abroad" 
consisting of former Soviet Republics; the U.S. "zone" would be 
the rest of the world. Cooperation would follow the model of the 
TMD exercise: the forces would work separately but to a common 
purpose. Sharing intelligence and planning information is the 
primary operational question. Intelligence about an adversary's 
intentions is particularly useful. 
Human intelligence might be the best method of gaining 
information about intentions. Recruiting and maintaining agents 
in locations where they can gather useful information is a 
delicate and difficult endeavor. According to Tim Weiner, 
"American spies overseas are almost all based in embassies, 
posing as diplomats and targeting their opposite numbers. But 
the United States has no embassies in Iran, Iraq or North Korea. 
And most terrorists, weapons dealers and drug kingpins do not 
wear white tie and tails. " 51 The effectiveness of American 
foreign spy recruitment efforts is periodically questioned during 
51 Tim Weiner, "The CIA's most Important Mission: Itself," 
New York Times Sunday Magazine, 10 December 1995, p. 62, Nexis, 
online. 
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scandals, such as occurred in February 1996 when five Americans 
in Paris were accused of trying to bribe French government 
officials. 52 Coming on top of the Ames uproar, many Members of 
Congress began to question the utility of even trying to recruit 
foreign spies, preferring to rely on American technology and open 
source information as less likely to give rise to scandal. 
Human intelligence may be an area in which Russia possesses 
a relative advantage over the United States, such that Russian 
cooperation could help overcome U.S. intelligence deficiencies. 
William Casey, CIA director under President Reagan, well 
understood the importance of recruiting foreign spies: he is 
credited with recruiting 200 agents against Nazi Germany. As 
Casey wrote in The Secret War Against Hitler (a posthumously 
published chronicle of his wartime experiences), "I believe that 
it is important today to understand how clandestine intelligence, 
covert action, and organized resistance saved blood and treasure 
in defeating Hitler. " 53 The common task today is to apply these 
same methods to identify WMD-armed rogue states and terrorists 
and their weaknesses. 
~Tim Weiner, "CIA Confirms Blunders During Economic Spying 
on France," New York Times, 13 March 1996, p. A10, Nexis, online. 
53William Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler (Washington, 
DC: Regnery, 1988), p. xiv. 
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2. Interdiction 
This thesis assumes that it would be relatively simpler for 
Russians to interdict WMD on or near their territory than for the 
United States to attempt to carry out the same operation 
unilaterally in that area. In the hypothetical scenario 
involving Iran, military activity could face conditions similar 
to those in neighboring Afghanistan, where Russia has a great 
deal of experience. Logistically and operationally, and in terms 
of intelligence support, the chances of success of a preemptive 
strike against Iran's WMD capabilities would be enhanced by 
Russian cooperation. 
Russian response force members would probably include 
soldiers who share a common language, ethnic and cultural traits 
and religious beliefs with military personnel in the area of 
operations. These soldiers could be more easily assimilated and 
hidden in the area of operations if necessary. 54 If political 
considerations precluded the employment of U.S. response forces, 
Russian troops might be able to seize and disable or destroy WMD 
to both countries' benefit. 
The goal of catching the WMD proliferant off guard would 
likely be met the first time it was attempted. William McRaven 
states that a necessary condition for the success of a special 
54Adapted from Lt. Col. Robert D. Lewis, "SOF Planning for 
Coalition Operations," Special Warfare, October 1994, p. 29. 
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operations mission is the achievement of relative superiority 
over the adversary. 55 An adversary may believe that it has 
anticipated the reaction of one country or the other, but not 
both combined, giving the interdiction force this relative 
superiority. As with airline highjackers, rogue states and 
terrorists could be expected to learn from the experiences of 
others, a circumstance that could lessen the future advantages of 
Russian-American cooperation as the details became known. 56 
McRaven describes simplicity as the most crucial principle 
in achieving relative superiority, and defines the term as 
limiting the number of objectives, good intelligence, and 
innovation. "Sharing the load" by inviting coalition 
participation is a method of making the number of objectives 
manageable. Improved intelligence should result from pooling the 
available resources. Innovation would result from the use of new 
technology and from working as a coalition. This overview of 
McRaven's theory of special operations suggests that there may be 
circumstances in which bilateral cooperation would be superior to 
a unilateral operation. Lucien S. Vandenbroucke cautions, 
however, that this may not be the case. 
55William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special 
Operations Warfare, Theory and Practice (Novato, California: 
Presidio Press, 1995), pp. 4-23. 
56 James Adams, "Handcuffing Hostage Rescuers; The Hijackers 
Have Learned the Lessons of Mogadishu," The Washington Post, 17 
April 1988, p. C5, Nexis, online. 
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Vandenbroucke has identified several reasons for the likely 
failure of strategic special operations. These reasons are 
faulty intelligence; insufficient coordination and cooperation 
between the services and agencies involved; poor information and 
advice, often presented to senior decision makers; wishful 
thinking; and excessive control over mission execution by senior 
military or civilian officials far from the theater of 
operations. 57 These causes of failure might be doubly likely to 
arise in a bilateral Russian-American operation. Partial access 
to a second intelligence stream might not, for example, convince 
decision makers to change their assumptions. The problems of 
coordination would be magnified in dealing with another 
bureaucratic structure. While a bilateral operation would have 
to incorporate a second opinion, there is no guarantee that both 
would not "become insidiously attracted to strategic operations, 
to the point of engaging in wishful thinking, in which hopes 
distort perception and wishes are mistaken for reality." 58 One 
need only reflect on Russian actions in Chechnya or on U.S. 
failures (such as Desert One during the Carter administration) to 
realize that two heads may not be better than one. 
57Vandenbroucke, pp. 152-69. 
58 Ibid., p. 7. 
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3. Sabotage 
Sabotage can be distinguished from interdiction in that its 
methodology is usually clandestine. An example is the 1990 
destruction by fire of the Libyan chemical weapons plant at 
Rabta, which Libya has blamed on U.S. and/or Israeli agents, 
charges both have denied. 59 As the United States may be 
considering a preemptive strike against Libya's replacement 
underground chemical· weapons facility at Tarhunah, 60 it could be 
useful to consider the possibility of a clandestine Russian-
American strike against WMD in Libya or Iran. 
The success of a clandestine mission would depend on 
security and trust. U.S. confidence in the Russian ability to 
maintain operational security might be low--and vice-versa. One 
mechanism for improving security would be to pass sensitive 
information only when required by the circumstances; this could, 
however, create an information bottleneck, which might slow 
decision making. The bottleneck would not result from the need 
to totally declassify information in order for it to be 
exchanged. For example, the United States has treated as 
classified Soviet and Russian nuclear weapons inventory 
59
" Stop Libya Without Nukes," The Atlanta Journal and 
Constitution, 26 April 1996, p. 18A, Nexis, online. 
60
"Libya' s Chemical Threat May Force U.S. to Strike," USA 
Today, 9 May 1996, p. 14A, Nexis, online. 
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information since at least 1969, when the SALT negotiations 
began. 
Russian defense decision making is dependent on the 
willingness of key individuals to become personally involved in 
the implementation of a new program. A historical study of a 
coalition of unequal partners (France and Russia during World War 
I) concluded that "the proper functioning of coalitions depends 
on the personal relations of the commanders in the field who were 
called upon to enact mutual cooperation." 61 Much of the success 
of the CTR program in improving Russian nuclear weapons storage 
security has depended on the involvement of Russian 3-star 
General Yevgeniy Maslin, head of the Russian Ministry of 
Defense's 12th Main Directorate, which has responsibility for the 
security of the Strategic Rocket Forces. 62 More recently, it 
took four meetings in 1995 between Russian Minister of Defense 
Grachev and U.S. Defense Secretary Perry to secure Russian 
agreement to participate in the Dayton Peace Accord's 
Implementation Force. The willingness of Secretary Perry and 
other U.S. officials to work with the Russians on this basis is 
61 Jehuda L. Wallach, Uneasy Coalition: The Entente 
Experience in World War I, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1993), p. 4. 
62
"Prepared Testimony of Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Assistant 
Secretary for International Security Policy, for the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee," Federal News Service, 4 October 
1994, unpaged, Nexis, online. 
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to some degree dependent on their personalities. Other officials 
may be less accommodating or may have other priorities. 
C. CRITERIA FOR EFFECTIVE SOF MISSIONS 
Three sets of criteria can be proposed to determine how 
Russian cooperation in a WMD counterproliferation contingency 
might create a greater likelihood of success for the operation. 
Military criteria examine Russian preparedness to contribute to 
an operation. Short-term political criteria emphasize the 
avoidance of scandal. Long-term political criteria concern 
strategic motives for seeking Russian participation even in the 
face of shortcomings in the military and short-term areas. 
1. Military Criteria 
After Chechnya, the operational reliability of the Russian 
military is certainly open to question. "Nearly every aspect of 
military activity--from training, supply, coordination among 
services, strategy, tactics, morale, and fighting spirit--failed 
the test of battle." 63 This judgement also applies to Russian 
elite special forces units, as was seen in the debacle at 
Pervomayskoye in January 1996, when approximately 75 Chechen 
insurgents escaped encirclement by over 1000 of these "spetsnaz" 
63Timothy L. Thomas, "Fault Lines and Factions in the 
Russian Army, Orbis, vol. 39, no. 4 (Fall 1995), p. 531. 
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forces. 64 Given such deficiencies, the utility of including the 
Russian military in a preemptive counterproliferation strike in 
any role more active than information-sharing seems dubious--at 
least until military reforms have taken hold. 
2. Short-Term Political Criteria 
The question of the political costs, in both Moscow and 
Washington, of the United States being part of a failed NBC-EST 
response must be acknowledged. Cooperation limited to 
information-sharing through classified communications links could 
more easily be kept confidential than the presence of advisors 
from another country. Keeping such a foreign presence out of the 
public eye might be particularly important in the event of 
setbacks. 
A partially analogous situation arose with the involvement 
of the British Special Air Service (SAS) at Waco. The 1995 House 
hearings on the 1993 Waco tragedy revealed the involvement of 
both U.S. and British military forces in the decision-making 
process that ended the siege. Two Delta Force commando unit 
commanders consulted with Attorney General Janet Reno. This was 
appropriate in that the Delta Force specializes in anti-terrorist 
and hostage-rescue operations, but sensitive, because federal law 
prohibits the military from direct participation in civil law 
64
"Russia 1 s Rotten Army," Jane 1 s Intelligence Review, March 
1996, p. 99. 
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enforcement. 65 It was, however, surprising that two British SAS 
"observers" were also invited to the scene, even though the SAS 
forces have a notorious reputation in Ireland and among Irish-
Americans for their conduct in policing Northern Ireland. 66 
Congressman Peter King, R-NY, publicized this fact, asking why a 
foreign military· force, with what he called "a disgraceful human 
rights record," was advising the FBI. 67 This reaction is mild 
compared to what might be said in Russia should a debacle 
involving American assistance occur. A debacle that could be 
blamed on the Americans--no matter how unfairly--could lead to a 
violent anti-American reaction, depending on the circumstances. 
3. Long-Term Political Criteria 
While the short-term goal of avoidance of scandal cannot be 
ignored, there are long-term political motives for trying to 
obtain Russian cooperation in a coalition for WMD 
counterproliferation contingencies. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer 
Morrison Taw emphasize that governments faced with terrorism must 
have a comprehensive national plan which includes the following 
elements: effective overall command and coordination; effective 
65Kirk Spitzer, "Lawmakers Held Classified Meeting About 
Waco with Army Commandos," Gannet News Service, 31 July 1995, 
Nexis, online. 
66Dave Eisenstadt, "GOP-ers Rip Brit Help at Siege," (New 
York) Daily News, 1 August 1995, p. 16, Nexis, online. 
67
"SAS had Aided FBI on Waco Siege, Hearing is Told," The 
Irish Times, 2 August 1995, p. 7, Nexis, online. 
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antiterrorist legislation combined with measures to build public 
trust and support; coordination within and between intelligence 
services; and collaboration with foreign governments and security 
forces. 68 
Hoffman and Taw conclude that foreign collaboration "is 
capricious, depending completely on the individual political and 
economic interests of the countries involved and, to a lesser 
extent, on the personalities and relationships between political 
leaders as well as senior police, military, and security service 
personnel. " 69 To reduce capriciousness, collaboration must be 
based on shared interests. To the degree that the problem of WMD 
proliferation arises from leakage from Russia, the collaboration 
of the Russian Federation may be critical to aid detection and 
interdiction, but international cooperation may also help Russia 
maintain control over its WMD assets. 
WMD counterproliferation may require protracted campaigns 
involving vigilance of indefinite duration against rogue states 
and terrorists. A change in regime may close a chapter on a 
specific rogue state, but against terrorism there will probably 
be many battles without any final victory. The elimination of 
one terrorist may require tremendous energy and treasure yet will 
68Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic 
Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency (RAND Note N-
3506-DOS, 1992), p. v. 
69Hoffman and Taw, p. 127. 
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not suffice. According to Jeffrey Simon, 
Progress will be achieved at times, periodic arrests of 
terrorists will be made, bombs will be detected and 
plots uncovered, support for terrorist activity will be 
temporarily suspended by certain states, and 
governments will cooperate to varying degrees in 
antiterrorist efforts. But terrorists will always have 
an advantage, since a single incident at the right time 
can lead to a perception that no progress has been made 
in the fight against terrorism. 70 
Maintaining support in both Russia and the United States for 
a protracted coalition campaign would be a challenging leadership 
problem. Governments and militaries prefer unilateral action and 
control. Coalition arrangements are usually created to deal with 
a threat too big for one nation to stand against, but the term 
coalition usually refers to a temporary arrangement. (The term 
alliance often refers to a long term arrangement.) 71 This thesis 
has considered how Russia and the United States might join 
together for particular operations ·in WMD counterproliferation; 
present political realities do not allow for consideration of an 
alliance between the two countries. 
D. SUMMARY 
Information-sharing is the most likely form of Russian-
American cooperation in these hypothetical WMD contingencies. 
Timely and accurate information from Russia would improve the 
70Simon, p. 39. 
71Martha Maurer, Coalition Command and Control (Washington, 
DC: National Defense University, 1994), p. 9. 
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chances for success of any operation against rogue states or WMD-
armed terrorists. The information likely to be passed would 
reveal sensitive details about the capabilities and weaknesses of 
Russian WMD materials and safeguarding methods. The willingness 
of Russia to pass such information would depend on an assessment 
that the planned operation is in Russia's national interest. 
The ability of Russian Spetsnaz forces (or their successors) 
to contribute in a positive way to the SOF missions of detection, 
interdiction and sabotage is questionable. The possibility 
exists that, as military reforms continue in Russia, this 
situation could improve and more active roles could be found for 
Russian special forces. The decision to include more active 
participation would depend on a mutual willingness to take the 
risk of suffering short-term recriminations from critics as part 
of a long-term strategy against WMD proliferation. 
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IV. MODELS FOR SOF COOPERATION IN WMD COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
In its search for the most effective methods of dealing with 
WMD counterproliferation contingencies, the United States may 
consider soliciting the assistance of Russia. This assistance 
would have several precedents, including joint peacekeeping, the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the DOE Lab-to-Lab 
Initiative. Cooperation in nuclear areas has not been matched in 
chemical or biological areas. Russian models for operations 
involving WMD counterproliferation probably derive from the 
Soviet Spetsnaz forces. U.S. models include the Nuclear 
Emergency Search Team and U.S. Special Operations Command Special 
Mission Units. Command and control of a Russian-American 
response force would demand the use of modern communications 
technology and creative operational planning and tactics, such as 
suggested by the USMC Commandant's Warfighting Lab. 
A. PRECEDENTS 
1. Joint Peacekeeping 
Russian views of the future security environment throw light 
on current Russian military activities. The evidence from 
ongoing activities demonstrates that Russia is willing to enforce 
its claims on some of the other former Soviet republics, and that 
to a large degree the United States has acquiesced to this 
arrangement. To a high degree within the former Soviet Union and 
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to a lesser degree in the former Warsaw Pact countries, Russia 
has repeatedly argued that its security interests must take 
precedence; for this reason Russia has resisted NATO expansion to 
the east and international scrutiny of its "peacekeeping" efforts 
within the former Soviet Union. Under the rubric of peacekeeping, 
sizable Russian forces have been dispatched to Georgia, 
Tajikistan, and Chechnya. 
These extensive activities color Russian perceptions of U.S. 
peacekeeping operations. For example, many Russians consider 
American recourse to the United Nations simply a cover in the 
same manner that Russia sometimes chooses a Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) cover or even U.N. involvement, judging 
that these are useful methods of accomplishing national strategic 
purposes. Russia does not accept humanitarianism as a goal in 
itself, in contrast with the manner in which the U.S. presents 
its involvement in Bosnia. 
Since the Cold War ended, the United States has been 
involved in Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia. According 
to Bob Deans, "in each case, it took U.S. soldiers to turn back 
aggression, prop up democracy, restore order or simply staunch 
the bloodshed. It is a costly and perhaps politically 
unsustainable pattern, putting American treasure and thousands of 
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American lives at risk. " 72 The alternative to this pattern is an 
emerging doctrine called ~preventive defense," with the aim of 
keeping dangerous situations from becoming military threats to 
the United States. 73 The ideal is preventive crisis management; 
the counter-argument is that it seems there must be a crisis 
before the U.S. government can be mobilized to do anything. 
The post-cold war pattern is for the United States to lead a 
multinational coalition, as in the case of Haiti. Through the 
mechanism of "dual-hatting" U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Kinzer was 
the commander of both the U.N. Mission in Haiti and the Commander 
of U.S. Forces Haiti. 74 This blueprint was incorporated into 
the planning of U.S.-led multinational peacekeeping exercises 
such as ~cooperative Nugget 95," which was held in August 1995 at 
Fort Polk, Louisiana. This was the first exercise on U.S. soil 
involving 14 formerly communist nations, with Russia notably 
absent. ~cooperative Nugget 95'' used the fictional scenario of a 
border conflict between two countries, leading to the dispatch of 
an international force charged with peacekeeping. The exercise 
was aimed at teaching the soldiers from the various countries how 
72Bob Deans, ~stopping Wars Before They Occur," The Atlanta 
Constitution, 31 March 1996, p. 9. 
73William J. Perry, ~u.s. Security Policy Stresses 
Prevention, Deterrence," USIA Wireless File, 6 March 1996, p. 15. 
74Robert B. Killebrew and David H. Petraeus, "Winning the 
Peace: Haiti, the U.S. and the UN," Armed Forces Journal 
International, April 1995, p. 40. 
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to cooperate and communicate despite different languages, and how 
to establish command posts. 75 
Russia refused to participate in an exercise that would have 
placed it on the same basis as the East Europeans, because the 
Russians still view themselves as a global power. Russia did 
agree to participate in bilateral exercises at Ft Riley, Kansas, 
in November 1995. These bilateral exercises were viewed as 
reciprocation for the "Peacekeeper 94" exercises held a year 
before in Russia at Totskoye. The exercises at Totskoye were the 
first involving U.S. soldiers on Russian soil. The United States 
recognized that "Peacekeeper 94" was more a symbolic breaking 
down of the Iron Curtain than serious military training. "In the 
future, the American and Russian armies would like to draw up 
regulations on joint armed peacekeeping operations for higher-
level staffs, since the Totskoye exercises were held at the level 
of joint patrols or checkpoints, for the most part." 76 The 
exercises did set a precedent for Russian participation in the 
U.S.-led Bosnian Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). 
Bosnia is at the limits of the Russian sphere of interest. 
75Emmanuel Serot, "First Eastern European Exercise on U.S. 
Soil," Agence France Presse (wire service), 7 August 1995, 
unpaged, Nexis, online. 
76Pavel Felgengauer, "Friendship: Russians and Americans 
Liked Holding Maneuvers Together," Sevodnya, 8 September 1994, 
p. 2; translated in the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 
5 October 1994, p. 24. 
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Despite the severe economic difficulties in Russia and Russian 
military commitments elsewhere, Russia wanted to participate in 
the implementation of the Dayton agreements to demonstrate that 
it is still a regional power, but for domestic political reasons 
could not agree to have its forces subordinate to NATO. It was 
acceptable, however, to place Russian forces under U.S. command, 
and U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry and Russian Minister of 
Defense Grachev agreed on Russian participation in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement IFOR. The Russian contingent would be commanded 
by an American general, Supreme Allied Commander Europe George 
Joulwan, and his deputy would be Colonel-General Leonty Shevtsov, 
deputy director of the Russian General Staff's Chief Operations 
Administration and former commander of the first three months of 
operations in Chechnya. According to Russian journalist Ilya 
Bulavinov, "at first glance the agreement seems ... questionable 
(it is very difficult to distinguish between the concepts of 
'American general' and 'commander in chief of NATO forces'), but 
the accord is valuable to Moscow in that the United States had 
agreed to Russian participation in all aspects of the 
peacekeeping operation."77 The Pentagon had initially insisted 
that the Russians perform auxiliary functions (engineering work, 
77 Ilya Bulavinov, "It's Easier to Reach Agreement in the 
Field," Kommersant-Daily, 31 October 1995, p. 1; translated in 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 29 November 1995, p. 27. 
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J 
mine clearing, and construction) but not participate in military 
operations per se, such as separating the former belligerents and 
taking up positions in certain sectors. 
According to General Joulwan, the Dayton peace accord has 
resulted in the most significant military and political 
cooperation with Russia since World War II: "This joint NATO-
Russian mission proves that the two former adversaries can 
achieve peaceful goals through military cooperation. It has also 
widened mutual understanding and trust ... a direct result and a 
natural result of a common mission. This cooperation can become 
an enduring framework for partnership into the next century."78 
One hoped-for outcome is that Moscow will see how the Alliance 
operates and soften its opposition to NATO's enlargement. 
2. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction _(CTR) program, controlled 
by the Department of Defense (DOD), has been the Clinton 
administration's principal tool for working with the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union to improve 
nuclear security. 79 Initially the program dealt with improving 
78George A. Joulwan, "When Ivan Meets GI Joe," Washington 
Post, 28 April 1996, p. C3. 
79 Jessica E. Stern, "U.S. Assistance Programs for Improving 
MPC&A (Material Protection, Control, and Accounting) in the 
Former Soviet Union," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 3, no. 2 
(Winter 1996), p. 22. 
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nuclear weapon transportation security by providing 'armored 
blankets,' special transportation canisters, emergency response 
vehicles, and rail cars designed to test rail bed stability (the 
Russian practice is to transport nuclear weapons by train) . In 
1993, the program expanded to include fissile material security 
at storage sites, production facilities, and laboratories. 
Given the scale of the WMD proliferation threat potential in 
the former Soviet Union, only a government-to-government program 
of the magnitude of CTR is likely to have sufficient resources to 
make a difference in reducing the amount of WMD materials and the 
danger of their diversion. It appears, however, that the 
Russians are generally dissatisfied with this program because 
(from a Russian perspective) the funds are spent in an 
inefficient fashion in the United States. 80 Under CTR, no funds 
are provided directly to Russians, only equipment and expertise 
contracted for in the United States. In fiscal year 1996, 
overall funding has suffered together with the budget for foreign 
aid. CTR has nonetheless set many precedents for Russian-
American cooperation and has increased the level of common 
training and the quantity of equipment related to WMD 
80
" Testimony of Constantine C. Menges, Director, Program on 
Transitions to Democracy, Elliot School of International Affairs, 
the George Washington University, Before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee," 
Federal News Service, 16 May 1996, Nexis, online. 
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counterproliferation. 
3. Lab-to-Lab Initiative 
The DOE Lab-to-Lab initiative is more directly relevant to 
the possibility of increased WMD counterproliferation 
cooperation. A survey of counterproliferation collaboration 
between Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Arzamas-16, a 
Russian nuclear weapons laboratory, showed that LANL provided 
equipment and training to improve Russian response capabilities 
to deal with accidents involving nuclear weapons. 81 A pilot 
demonstration project using off-the-shelf intrusion sensors was 
recently carried out at the Kurchatov nuclear laboratory in 
Moscow and at the Argonne National Laboratory. If the intrusion 
sensors detect activity within a vault used for storing weapon 
pits, a video camera is automatically tripped, and images are 
retrieved on demand via telephone lines in Russia and the United 
States. 82 These projects, although smaller in scale than those 
under CTR, provide common training and equipment and lay a 
foundation for a bilateral capability in WMD counterproliferation 
contingencies. 
81
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82
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4. Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Cooperation in joint peacekeeping and CTR has not been 
matched in the chemical and biological weapons fields. "Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin and other top leaders appear committed to 
abolishing such weapons, the administration said in an 
interagency report, but bureaucratic infighting, shortages of 
funds and some residual resistance among lower-level officials 
have left sensitive issues unresolved and blocked some data 
exchanges." 83 The United States has been more open than Russia 
about its chemical weapons programs, unilaterally revealing the 
amount and types of its chemical weapons in storage. 84 
B. RUSSIAN MODELS 
Russian special forces which could be employed in WMD 
contingencies are generally known by the Russian composite word 
"spetsnaz," meaning special purpose. Russian Spetsnaz troops are 
a legacy of the Soviet Army's concern with the West's deployment 
of tactical nuclear weapons in the 1950's. 85 Soviet Spetsnaz 
troops were trained to go behind enemy lines to locate these 
83Thomas W. Lippman, "Administration Voices Concern on 
Russian Treaty Compliance; Congress Told Moscow's Chemical, Germ 
Weapon Plans Are Suspect," Washington Post, 11 December 1994, p. 
A36. 
84
"Army Exposes Chemical Secret," Associated Press Online, 
22 January 1996, unpaged, Nexis, online. 
85Viktor Suvorov, Spetsnaz: The Inside Storv of the Soviet 
Special Forces (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1987), p. 5. 
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nuclear weapons and destroy them. Additional targets included 
command, control and communications elements and key logistic 
centers. 86 
These military reconnaissance commandos were subordinate to 
the Soviet Army General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate 
(GRU) . 87 Police commandos for riot control, usually known by the 
Russian acronym "OMON," were subordinate to the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) , while commandos whose missions included 
sabotage and assassination were subordinate to the KGB. 
Following the break-up of the USSR, the budget for the Russian 
armed forces has nearly collapsed, while greater resources have 
gone to the MVD to deal with internal unrest as in Chechnya and 
to the KGB successor organizations to deal with organized 
crime. 88 One reason for this shift may be that President Yeltsin 
suspects the regular Army of disloyalty to himself and prefers to 
shift resources to the other security services. 89 At present, 
the MVD may have the best capabilities to deal with terrorism, 
86A listing of Soviet Spetsnaz targets can be found in James 
Adams, "Soviet Special Forces in America: The Day Before," Orbis, 
vol. 32, no. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 202-203. 
87 John J. Dziak, "The Soviet Approach to Special 
Operations," in Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar and Richard H. 
Shultz, eds., Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 111. 
88Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Intelligence Commandos," Jane's 
Intelligence Review, vol. 7, no. 11 (November 1995), p. 483. 
89 Thomas, p. 532. 
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and is considering establishing a unit specializing in nuclear 
terrorism. 90 Russian Spetsnaz units may no longer be 
operationally effective, and adequate replacements may have not 
yet been created. 
C. U.S. MODELS 
1. Nuclear Emergency Search Team 
The NEST organization was developed in 1975, when DOE began 
to consider the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain 
or manufacture a nuclear device. 91 When a nuclear threat is 
received, usually via the FBI, the DOE's Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL) Communicated Threat Credibility Center 
uses trained assessors with nuclear weapons expertise to evaluate 
the threat. If the threat sounded genuine, NEST personnel would 
fly in from around the country on military transport and divide 
the threatened city into search grids (the assumption is that the 
target would be a city to maximize the destructiveness of a 
nuclear explosion) . The basic NEST tasks would be to detect, 
access, analyze, package, decontaminate, and remove the nuclear 
weapon. DOE aircraft can do photographic reconnaissance; 
helicopters equipped with radiation detectors can also sweep an 
area as well, but a nuclear weapon gives off little telltale 
90Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Intelligence Commandos. IF 
91 Summarized from Douglas Waller, "Nuclear Ninjas, IF Time, 8 
January 1996, pp. 38-40. 
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radiation and would be nearly impossible to find from above in a 
dense urban area. Most of the search would have to be conducted 
on the ground, using minivans fitted with electron detectors. As 
many as 100 two-person teams, dressed as inconspicuously as 
possible, would be sent on foot patrols with handheld radiation 
detection equipment. 
If a nuclear device was found, the NEST would rely on 
diagnostic and assessment teams to determine the best way to 
cripple the bomb. These teams also have equipment to contain a 
radiological dispersion device. Officially NEST would be onsite 
to advise the FBI in handling the threat, but operationally NEST 
would be in control and could call in military special operations 
counterterrorist squads if necessary to assist the FBI's domestic 
counterterrorism commandos. 92 The NEST command post has a 
special communications system to provide links with the White 
House, the Pentagon, the CIA, the FBI, and the State Department. 
Annual NEST exercises are conducted to test operational 
procedures. A "recent" exercise in New Orleans was said to have 
required more than 1000 people from NEST, the Pentagon, the FBI 
and the CIA, at a cost of around $10 million. 93 Cost-cutting 
considerations have led to discussions about merging NEST with 
92Anthony L. Kimery, "Your Life May Depend on the Woman from 
NEST," The Washington Times, 23 October 1995, p. 12, Nexis, 
online. 
93 Ibid., p. 14. 
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the DOD's Special Operations Command. 94 According to Anthony 
Kimery, "this [consolidation] would make deployment easier and 
more efficient, and would result in an even better flow of 
intelligence and analysis for NEST's special needs, given that 
the intelligence NEST now relies on is largely drawn from the CIA 
and Defense Department intelligence agencies anyway." 95 The 
counterargument to consolidation is that the Defense Department 
places too much emphasis on protecting its own troops on the 
battlefield and not enough on countering the threat to 
civilians. 96 
This argument between government agencies shows that the 
United States has yet to define a comprehensive 
counterproliferation strategy. According to Senator Domenici: 
We need better integration of all of the government's 
assets and more focus on coordinating our response to 
the danger posed by WMD. Considerable new thinking is 
required as well if this initiative is to succeed in 
giving us the ability to respond effectively to new 
proliferation dangers without creating a host of new 
problems for other aspects of our foreign and defense 
policies. 97 
94
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Existing and emerging technological capabilities could be 
essential to the success of a counterproliferation strategy. One 
useful approach would be to adapt the NEST methodology to create 
a less narrowly specialized response force with the expertise 
concerning WMD provided electronically as needed. 
2. Special Mission Units 
The Department of Defense has an analogous capability to 
respond to terrorist chemical and biological weapons. Special 
Mission Units are an elite force within the U.S. Special 
Operations Command, "deep black operations units which operate in 
civilian clothes and handle the most sensitive and risky counter-
terrorist and counter-intelligence operations. Because of the 
nature of their work, these men are given a long leash and lots 
of money with lax accountability to carry out their 
assignments." 98 Little unclassified information is available 
about Special Mission Units. The statement below is the most 
extensive summary available: 
For crisis management, Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) is prepared to provide its Special Mission 
Units to help resolve terrorist incidents. These units 
are always on alert, are trained in handling BW and CW 
agents and effects, have state-of-the-art protective 
suits and masks, and can render safe and recover BW and 
CW agents. These SOCOM units are supported by a 
specialized Chemical/Biological Response Unit, 
consisting of a Technical Escort Unit which is trained 
98
" Special Ops Morale Dives," Intelligence Newsletter, 12 
October 1995, unpaged, Nexis, online. 
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to search, sample, recover and transport agents; and 
on-call teams from the Army's and Navy's laboratories 
and CW/BW commands for expert knowledge on the scene. 
For consequence management, DOD would provide through 
FEMA the capabilities of Army NBC Defense Units, 
together with military medical care capabilities and 
supplies. A number of initiatives exist for upgrading 
these capabilities, as well as for strengthening their 
links to civilian agencies, which would be the first to 
respond to such incidents, and to foreign 
governments. 99 
This indicates that the United States does have capabilities 
for chemical and biological as well as nuclear scenarios. These 
capabilities could serve as models for organizing operations in 
cooperation with foreign governments. 
3. Commandant's Warfighting Lab 
In October 1995, Marine Corps Commandant General Charles 
Krulak established the Commandant's Warfighting Lab (CWL) in 
Quantico, Virginia, "to determine how massive amounts of new 
technology can be used to prepare the service for what officials 
contend will be small, geographically limited military conflicts, 
rather than the global conflicts characteristic of the 20th 
century. " 100 One of General Krulak' s first initiatives was the 
99
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formation of a team of Marines·trained to respond to chemical and 
biological weapons attacks on civilians or other targets. 
According to Mark Walsh, "the Biological/Chemical Weapons 
Response Force will be tied to its nerve center in Norfolk, 
Virginia, where an electronic reach-back advisory group of 
civilian biological and chemical experts will provide advice and 
instruction in matters being handled by the on-scene Marines."101 
"Electronic reach-back" from a more generic response force 
to a stable of experts could be the best method for responding to 
certain types of WMD counterproliferation situations, 
particularly against terrorists when there is incomplete 
information about the exact nature of the threat they present. 
As Nicholas Negroponte has explained, it is faster and far 
cheaper to move digitized bits of information than the experts 
with the information. 102 With electronic reach-back, a 
multipurpose and multinational response team begins to make 
sense, because the required expertise could be drawn from 
anywhere if the means of communication have been anticipated. 
Despite the desirability of having, for example, a nuclear 
weapons designer onsite to provide expertise in the event of a 
nuclear weapons accident, this may not be practical, particularly 
101Mark Walsh, "Marine Lab Will Be Hallmark of Warfighting," 
Defense Week, 2 January 1996, unpaged, Nexis, online. 
102Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995), p. 11. 
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within the former Soviet Union. Anyone who has traveled in 
Russia knows that transportation, particularly to remote 
locations, can be extremely difficult to arrange. Making sure 
that the appropriate expert is onsite may be further complicated 
by incomplete initial reports. For example, it is possible to 
use fissile materials other than highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 
plutonium in weapons; it is possible that Russia has produced, 
weaponized, and stockpiled these other materials. 103 Another 
complication is that the ideal WMD response team should have some 
capability for all types of WMD, as the threat posed may be a 
composite one. 
Electronic reach-back could also help overcome linguistic 
difficulties associated with a multinational response team. A 
response force could communicate with appropriate experts by data 
sent directly from sensors, with voice communications providing 
supplementary capabilities. This could help reduce 
misunderstandings as data would not require translation and 
analysis onsite; the raw data could be processed by the experts 
according to their own preferred methodology. Video images could 
complement the other information streams to provide a picture of 
the situation that would be as complete as possible. Command and 
103Kathleen C. Bailey, "Mutual Reciprocal Inspections: Issues 
Regarding Next Steps," page 2 of prepared text of talk at the 
Nuclear Transparency Initiatives Workshop, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 29 February 1996. 
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control problems would be more easily resolved if everyone could 
receive the same data simultaneously. 
Other modern technologies might also assist a less 
specialized response force. When the Israelis were preparing for 
their 1976 hostage-rescue operation at the Entebbe, Uganda, 
airport, they had built a physical model, to scale, of the 
airport for practice. (This was easy for them to do because 
Israeli engineers had designed the airport when the two nations 
were on friendly terms.) 104 Multimedia simulators could be used 
to convey a feel for a place, because it is not possible to build 
replicas of the setting of every potential hostage situation or 
of terrorist targets such as airports and embassies. 
A bilateral multipurpose response team need not rely 
exclusively on specially-developed technology. Some emergency 
management information systems are making use of the Internet to 
coordinate the functions of alert, mobilization, command and 
control, and remedial action. For example, in early February 
1996 Oregon suffered heavy rains that caused major flooding. Via 
the Internet anyone could receive weather data including 
satellite imagery from the Oregon Climate Service, information on 
stream flows and reservoir storage from the Army Corps of 
Engineers, and information on types of aid available and tips for 
104Negroponte, pp. 65-66. 
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recovering from a flood from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. 105 
The Internet is already widely available in Russia and could 
be helpful in coordinating emergency management with local 
jurisdictions. According to John O'Mahony, "there are now about 
100 servers operating throughout the country, and access 
providers can be found even in the more remote cities. Many 
indigenous users only subscribe to e-mail, an extremely useful 
and popular resource in a country where a letter, if it arrives 
at all, may take weeks to reach its destination. " 106 The G-7 has 
proposed a Global Emergency Management Information Network 
Initiative (GEMINI) to create an international capability using 
the Internet to deal with all sorts of disasters. 107 
"Unprecedented technology exists whereby all human emergency 
management knowledge could be instantly accessed to support all 
aspects of local to national emergency management." 108 This opens 
the possibility that a generic laptop computer linked to the 
10511 Flood Victims' Web Resources," Associated Press Online, 
13 February 1996, unpaged, Nexis, online. 
106 John O'Mahony, "Coffee With the Virtual Comrades; The Net 
Revolution Has Hit the Former Soviet Union," The Independent, 12 
February 1996, unpaged, Nexis, online. 
10711 Information Society: G-7 Pilot Projects Picking Up 
Steam," Tech Europe, 6 July 1995, unpaged, Nexis, online. 
108 From the GEMINI home page posted on the World Wide Web 
(http://hoshi.cic.sfu.ca/-g7/progressG7.html), accessed on 4 
March 1996. 
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Internet could be a valuable resource for any response team in 
situations where operational security is not of paramount 
concern. 
D. SUMMARY 
The precedent of Russian and U.S. willingness to find a 
working arrangement to participate in joint peacekeeping in 
Bosnia may augur well for efforts to define a working arrangement 
for joint WMD counterproliferation contingencies. Common 
training and equipment provided under the CTR program may 
facilitate cooperation in the WMD realm. 
A model for such cooperation might be found in the Soviet 
Spetsnaz experience, but current financial difficulties and 
changes in missions would likely hamper the Russian ability to 
stand up a WMD counterproliferation response team. The U.S. 
models of NEST and Special Mission Units currently function, but 
might be more effective with Russian information-sharing--an 
arrangement that might be facilitated by innovative technology 
being developed by the Commandant's Warfighting Lab. This is not 
only true for contingencies involving WMD materials of Russian 
origin; Russian expertise might provide a solution to otherwise 
intractable situations regarding a variety of other WMD 
proliferation challenges. 
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V. FRAMEWORKS FOR IMPLEMENTING COOPERATION 
There are at least three multinational "umbrellas" under 
which cooperation with Russia in counterproliferation might be 
pursued more effectively: under NATO's Partnership for Peace 
(PFP), under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), and under the Group of Seven plus Russia. Each of 
these institutions could contribute to a Russian-American 
counterproliferation response force, but the primary arrangement 
would have to be bilateral and reciprocal to secure both parties' 
agreement. An incremental approach similar to the Vienna 
Document Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) scheme 
could make both Russia and the United States more comfortable 
about pursuing joint military options to deal with WMD 
counterproliferation contingencies. 
A. MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION 
There is already a fairly extensive range of Partnership for 
Peace activities between NATO and selected states of the NIS, 
such as joint peacekeeping exercises, which could serve as a 
model for future cooperation. However, the reluctant 
participation of Russia, which inherited the bulk of the Soviet 
arsenal and defense facilities, is a major cause for concern. 
Military cooperation with Russia is contentious, for Russia would 
like to be treated on an equal basis with the United States as a 
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superpower. Russian non-cooperation might be overcome through 
the careful design of multilateral mechanisms which allow Russia 
to maintain its national self-respect. Russia dislikes PFP 
because it feels that it is treated as a junior partner and 
placed in a politically subordinate position. As seen in the 
Bosnian peace enforcement deployment, Russia will go to 
considerable lengths to not be seen as subordinate to its recent 
adversary. Russia prefers to deal with the OSCE, an institution 
based on an initiative from Moscow, in which all members have 
equal standing. 
The OSCE began as a regular series of conferences on 
European security issues, and was originally called the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It has become 
an organization with several functions, including acting as a 
clearinghouse to pass notifications required by the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. For this purpose, the OSCE has 
developed a computer-based communications network that links 43 
OSCE capitals, which includes all the NATO and PFP nations. 109 
For ease of comprehension, most of the traffic is in the form of 
strictly formatted messages, but the network has a secure voice 
capability as well. There is currently no provision for the OSCE 
to intervene militarily in any capacity, but the OSCE's network 
109 Joris Janssen Lok, "Security in Numbers on the OSCE 
Network," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 January 1996, p. 27. 
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might be useful in alerting a previously planned multinational 
response force of the imminent need for action. 
The Group of Seven (G-7) is primarily an economic 
organization, one that has shown great sympathy for Russian 
attempts to gain admittance. The G-7 agreed to a summit in April 
1996 in Moscow to discuss Russian nuclear safety issues. The G-7 
could increase the effectiveness of assistance programs to Russia 
in WMD proliferation by coordinating their activities and making 
sure that they address Russian priorities as well. Another 
advantage of the G-7 is that it brings Japan into the discussion; 
European security institutions do not address the fact that 
Russia extends far into Asia. The assistance programs could 
provide a common base of training and equipment which could be 
used by a multinational response force. 
B. BILATERAL RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION 
Russian-American cooperation in WMD counterproliferation 
would build on the strong tradition of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in 
arms control. The INF, START, and CFE treaties as well as the 
Vienna Document CSBMs all have provisions for reciprocal 
controlled visits by inspection teams from the member countries 
of sites containing nuclear delivery systems and other 
strategically significant treaty-limited items. The INF treaty 
set the pattern by ensuring absolute parity between the parties: 
what one can do in the other's country is precisely reciprocated. 
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Great care was taken in drafting the treaties to state each 
country's rights and responsibilities, and committees were 
established to meet at regular intervals to iron out unforeseen 
difficulties. The Russians have been conscientious about meeting 
their treaty obligations within their limited resources. The 
Russians accept these responsibilities willingly because doing so 
gives them the status and respect formerly accorded the USSR, the 
state with which most of these treaties were originally 
negotiated. 
C. CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING EXERCISES 
Objections to bilateral cooperation on counterproliferation 
might be overcome through arrangements comparable to those under 
the current Vienna Document CSBMs scheme. Russia has 
incrementally agreed to more intrusive inspections by foreign 
military officers on its territory because of the controls and 
safeguards guaranteed by the agreement. CSBMs allow the Russians 
to control what foreigners see, and over time the Russians have 
allowed foreigners to see more troops and equipment. This aspect 
of CSBMs would appeal to all sides, including the United States, 
which could initially heavily limit what is shared and relax the 
restrictions later if this was seen as desirable. 
A CSBM-type structure would prescribe full reciprocity so 
that no side would be placed at a disadvantage by the exchange. 
It is perhaps natural to expect that both sides would want to 
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receive as much as possible from the other and give as little as 
possible in return. One side might be willing to support the 
other to a disproportionate extent under some circumstances if it 
expected that under different circumstances it could receive 
greater support in return. A CSBM-type structure would have 
provisions for what types of assistance could be requested, with 
what timeliness, under what circumstances, etc. The structure 
would have to be exercised to develop confidence that it would 
work. With increasing confidence, the structure might be 
expanded. Even if this structure never brought a bilateral 
response team into action, it might set the groundwork for 
creating a "permissive environment" instead of a hostile one in 
which unilateral actions could take place under agreed-upon 
circumstances. 110 
A program of bilateral SOF cooperative exercises in limited 
counterproliferation scenarios would make a case that WMD 
proliferators face effective countermeasures and have nowhere to 
hide. The exercises would assure Russia, the United States, and 
U.S. allies of another form of protection against proliferation 
if and when it did indeed occur. In the past, protection was 
provided by U.S. theater and strategic nuclear forces, but today 
there is skepticism--at least in some quarters--that extended 
110Simon, p. 36. 
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nuclear deterrence would be effective. According to Stephen 
Cambone and Patrick Garrity, "not only are American nuclear 
weapons thought to frighten potential allies and coalition 
partners, but hostile regional powers may also believe that 
Washington lacks the will to employ nuclear weapons."111 In some 
circumstances, SOF intervention capabilities for counterprolif-
eration purposes could be a plausible substitute for extended 
nuclear deterrence; bilateral exercises could make these capa-
bilties convincing and endow them with some deterrent potential. 
D. SUMMARY 
A bilateral framework for cooperation which emphasizes 
reciprocity would probably be acceptable to both the United 
States and Russia. The incentive is that by gradually increasing 
cooperation both sides would understand and perhaps trust each 
other's capabilities and methodologies. This framework would 
have to be exercised so that this understanding and trust could 
grow. Even if the United States and Russia did not ever 
cooperate in an actual joint strategic special operation, the 
exercises might increase the willingness of one to allow the 
other to carry out such operations unilaterally. 
111 Stephen A. Cambone and Patrick J. Garrity, "The Future of 




This thesis has examined the desirability and feasibility of 
Russian-American cooperation in using special operations forces 
to conduct joint strategic special operations. It has compared 
Russian and U.S. views of the future security environment, 
particularly with regard to WMD proliferation contingencies that 
might exceed the capabilities of civilian agencies, looking for 
areas of overlap that could serve as the basis for mutually 
acceptable cooperative approaches to military options to deal 
with these threats. Information-sharing could serve the purpose 
of Russian-American cooperation in WMD counterproliferation, and 
this may initially be the most likely area of cooperation. 
Any Russian-American cooperative effort would reveal to the 
other side sensitive information about the capabilities and 
vulnerabilities in that area of cooperation. A major difficulty 
is that while the United States and Russia currently enjoy good 
relations, a change in the Russian political leadership could 
rapidly reverse this, and previously provided information could 
be used to the detriment of U.S. security interests. The 
proposed solution to this difficulty is to make agreements to 
share needed information only when the circumstances of the 
situation make it expedient to do so. 
The United States may still have a "window of opportunity" 
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to engage the Russians in bilateral counterproliferation 
activities, one component of which could be contingency SOF 
counterforce exercises. Because it is the primary inheritor of 
the former Soviet Union's WMD arsenal, Russia's involvement is 
essential to prevent a loss of control over these WMD materials 
and associated expertise. The disorganization following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and current economic difficulties in 
the former Soviet states make this region the most likely source 
of leakage of weapons of mass destruction, fissile materials and 
WMD expertise. The cooperation envisioned by this thesis need 
not require substantial new resources; equipment and training 
already provided or in place could be sufficient if innovative 
operational planning was undertaken. The effectiveness of any 
policy to prevent or counter WMD proliferation could be enhanced 
by including Russia in its development and execution. 
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